There’s been a terrible falsehood perpetrated on the American people, and now we’re all collectively paying for it. That is, that somehow we can all invest our way to untold wealth and designer lifestyles of the rich and famous while working for $8.50an hour at Wal-Mart, if only we can scrimp and sock away enough in our 401K’s and pension funds. After all, CEO’s and financial insiders get rich on their stock options and insider deals at Wall Street’s back door, why not us, at least a little bit too at Wall Street’s front door? I think most of us, by now, know the answer to this, that much of the wealth that financial markets appear to have been creating wasn’t real wealth at all, or even the tumultuous winners and losers kind of returns that Wall Street mostly ignores in their advertising, was, in reality, largely smoke and mirrors wealth. That is, wealth on paper only.
The proof of this is in the fact that it was initially estimated that there is between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion worth of bad mortgage based securities polluting the balance sheets of banks large and small. But by now, US taxpayers have anted up, not just the $350 billion in the original TARP funds bailout, but also nearly $2 trillion in loans from the Federal Reserve, plus now hundreds of billions for consolidations such as the purchase of investment house Merrill Lynch, by Bank of America, and more troubling, the nearly continuous upping of the rescue of insurance giant AIG, into which we’ve dumped $180 billion and counting.
AIG should be the poster child for all that is wrong in our financial system. Apart from their legitimate insurance businesses, insuring everything from you and me up to municipal bonds and cities governments (on which they’ve made nice profits over the years). With the help of Wall Street, AIG started issuing a different kind of insurance, the Credit Default Swap kind (CDS’s), on securities like Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO’s), which are essentially the end product investments created from the issuing of shaky sub-prime mortgages, which were created by now defunct banks like Bear-Stearns. From an insurance point of view, this was an unregulated activity, because it wasn’t called insurance, but a “swap”. That meant that there was no requirement for companies engaged in this activity to keep anything but a minimum cash on hand in order to pay out on bad CDO’s.
The assumption was that only a small percentage of the CDO’s would go bad because mortgage brokers would always be able to roll over outrageous loans into newer refinancing to smooth over the ridiculous terms that were built into the original loans, terms that included, sky-rocketing payments and interest rates along with impossible balloon notes. The reason that loans like that were written in the first place is that they could be sold as AAA rated securities to unknowing investors because companies like AIG guaranteed to pay for them if they failed.
We all know what happened next. The housing bubble (driven not just by the inflated demand that came about because of easy credit, but also significant over investment by real estate speculators) burst, and with it, the fortunes of all of the investment banks that generated the securities, and nearly the entire fly by night mortgage brokerage industry. And on this sinking ship are no only the securities that should sink (sleazy sub-prime mortgages), but also other mortgage loans that, all other things being equal, were still good. This is because the financial industry bundeled good loans along with not so good loans, along with crazy bad loans and sold them all mixed together as a good investment. Why would they do this? You might suspect that it was a bit of obfuscation to pass off bad loans with the good, and you might be right, but on paper, it was all insured, so what could go wrong?
Ok, so what’s it going to cost to get US out of this mess, that is, shouldn’t the losses have stopped by now, or at least slowed down? This is where it gets really tricky. You see, the business of converting mortgages into securities, and then insuring them, was so profitable that there weren’t enough mortgages around to meet the demand for these investments, many of which generated well above average returns for investors, such as the many commercial banks who bought CDO’s because of their promise of high returns. No problem, the investment banks started making synthetic CDO’s , that is, new CDO’s that were tied to the value of existing real CDO’s and the mortgages behind them, in a kind of shadow fashion. And so the investment banks went crazy with this (and other similar types of paper-only investments) and generated perhaps ten times as many of these as the originals. In other words, for every mortgage that goes bad, the losses get multiplied by ten times and then transferred to companies like AIG, which we, the taxpayers are now on the hook for. Pretty sweet deal for somebody, no risk investments that, when the whole thing gets too big to fail, the government steps in and picks it all up so that your great grandchildren can pay for it.
The simple fact is that the government doesn’t have the scratch to cover all of this, even with the now proposed record deficit, because the losses are as hidden as the gains were. The whole thing was in effect the biggest Ponzie scheme of all time (forget about $50 billion investment scam artist Bernie Madoff) because Wall street was generating paper that was based on the value of other paper that was based on the value or a much smaller investment market that was being inflated by the reinvestment of all that wealth materializing all over the place. The banks, in fact large parts of our banking system, became victims of this because they were no longer much in the business of making home loans that they held until maturity (and assumed that risk), but in the business of generating returns for shareholders. And so, they gobbled up many of the high return CDO’s and are holding them to this day, waiting for US, you and me the taxpayers, to bail them out.
It should be obvious by now that we are in a much bigger pickle than Washington (Bush or Obama – both administration’s treasury and banking advisors staffed by many of the same insiders who got us into this mess) wants to admit. It also should be obvious that we the taxpayers can’t cover all of these losses, and that we should not have even gone this far. That it should have been possible to separate the necessary insurance functions of AIG from the bogus obligations they had to investors, especially on worthless fake paper, but that is at the heart of the problem.
As a whole, what’s left of the financial industry has yet to come to the point of “truth and reconciliation” for the ongoing financial and now economic genocide that is taking place. That many, if not most of the people in the industry believe that if the government can just back-stop enough of the losses in home mortgages that the bleeding will cease and that they can get back to business as usual., trading shaky or worthless paper for whatever real value is still left in our houses and bank accounts.
I have a different plan, based on the assumption that there is and will continue to be far more losses than we as taxpayers can ever cover, even for several generations, let alone that we shouldn’t have to.
Step one. Declare a limited pre-bankruptcy condition on any bank that is holding any significant exposure to mortgage backed securities, CDO’s, CDS’s and the like. Right now regulators from the FDIC are pouring over the books of all of the major banking institutions in the country and subjecting them to a “stress test” to see if they can withstand more losses or not. Trouble is, they don’t know how much, or how little they should value their suspect investments, and so some people think they are being too optimistic in an effort to save the jobs of high profile (and politically connected) bank CEO’s like Citigroup’s Vikram Pandit. So as a general rule, if there is any exposure to these kinds of investments, or significant loans to other institutions with these kinds of investments, then they should immediately be treated as if they are in receivership and not wait for a bankruptcy filing.
The reason to do this is to stop the domino effect that could cause a collapse of the entire banking system, good banks and all. It’s very simple. You could even do it ahead of time for the whole system. Simply disallow the inter-institution loan rules that allow banks to call each other’s loans when things get shaky (unless they want to voluntarily do so). That way, when the FIDC finishes it’s analysis of the soundness of individual banks, there won’t be a feeding frenzy between banks as they race with each other of get what little they can out of each other’s coffers, collapsing the whole system.
Step two:
Force the mortgage servicing industry to fess up the percentages and investment destinations of bad and soon to fail loans so that CDO’s can be rated fairly, at least relative to current market conditions. Assume that there is no insurance for any of these, and also DO NOT back-stop any of the insurers, even if it means that they fail and that the entire insurance industry has to be reorganized along with the banks (and in the same ways – see below). There is a high likelihood that this will happen anyway, and putting our great grandchildren on the hook for it will not prevent this.
Step three:
Finish the stress tests, noting the percentages of real CDO’s, fake CDO’s, CDS’s (which were also sold off as “investments”), and so on, and the relative quality of them (based on the risk data from the mortgage servicers). Then, as has already been proposed, decide which banks are too far gone to save and liquidate them, which banks can be returned to health, and which banks are sound enough to continue on for better seas on their own. And the liquidations need to be done in the standard way that the FDIC approaches these matters, where they separate the good assets from the bad ones and create a separate resolution holding company to sell of the bad assets for whatever value is left in them. This way we don’t get the kind of special, and never ending, back door bailout deals that keep bleeding taxpayers while not getting rid of the troubled assets. Japan tried that approach in the 1990’s and it dragged down their economy for over ten years.
The government needs to do two things here. The first is assume that there is much too much bad paper floating around to absorb, and secondly get a real estimation of who is healthy and who is not, based on an honest estimation of the likely real value of any and all suspect assets. It’s interesting to note that even in the worst case scenario of all commercial banks in the US failing, the FDIC (and us taxpayers) is on the hook for about $4.5 trillion. While that number sounds enormous, and it is, the value of CDO’s, CDS’s and other “derivative securities”, many of which are bad and or should never have been issued (because there is nothing behind them), has conservatively been estimated to be at least $26 trillion in the US, and many times more than that globally. In short, if the US government continues on in the business of trying to prevent these kinds of losses, the US will become insolvent and the entire global financial system will surely collapse, along with whatever is left of the US and world economies.
All of this brings me back to my original point – that wealth on paper, when enough of it is generated and spread around, is not wealth at all, but a huge macro-economic time bomb. This is simply because there is not enough real wealth, based in the value of things of wealth (houses, cars, factories) to be represented by the paper. In the roaring twenties, it was stocks and bonds that got inflated out of control and then crashed. In the roaring turn of the 21st century, most all of the stocks and bonds (limited by necessary regulations) were eaten up by 401K’s and other private investments, and so with the rise of global hedge funds and the deferred risk “grow or die” culture of Wall Street and the Global finance system, other avenues of investments had to be invented to keep up with demand, or perhaps the whole things would have ground to a screeching halt years ago.
Here’s my general theory. The real growth of an economy is limited by two things, population and its productivity. Along with this, the return that an entire economy can give to investors is equal to the dollar value of real growth and no more. In other words, there is only so much real return to be had from an economy and so in financial markets there are going to be winners and losers. If you imagine that everyone can invest and win, the way hedging and other chains of endlessly growing investments seem to, then you either need to socialize returns in the markets and spread them around evenly (at whatever small percentage of real growth dollars that gets you) or you’re dreaming of something that can never be, and probably building a house of cards that will surely collapse. First the Asian financial collapse of the nineties and now the US / global collapse of `08 attest to this, and it is utter foolishness to continue thinking that this was just a minor glitch in the system, that if we had caught it early could have been avoided. Such thinking will only bring this about again, and drag out the days of financial reckoning that are necessary to move us past our current mess.
This begs the question, how much can Americans invest their way to retirement? The answer is only the percentage that an economy can grow based on real workers’ productivity, minus corporate cash. BUT – some of that productivity has to go directly into the stuff of real wealth owned by the populace, and not into endless chains of worthless investments chasing it’s tail. In other words, if Americans owned the stuff of wealth they produced (and productively produced it themselves), then the amount of money necessary for retirement would be smaller and could be kept in low return savings accounts the way we used to be, thus not demanding more investment return from an economy than it can deliver.
Instead, and as has been observed by others, the real wages of working Americans has been declining for decades now, savings rates have declined into negative numbers, and American households each owe tens of thousands of dollars in consumer debt. At the same time as this has transpired, corporate profits have soared and the darlings of Wall Street have seen double-digit growth, creating an expectation that that kind of return on investment can be had across the board. After that, all it took was a little “financial innovation” and suddenly we could all invest in the massive debt we were creating instead of saving for the future and owning, actually owning, what we could no longer, by and large, afford to own, because large parts of our previous wages are instead billowing up corporate balance sheets, and so looking for returns in the markets.
This brings me to my final point. That to sustain wealth in a society means that we have to be productive, and then distribute the products of that productivity far and wide. In a financial sense, this is the only way to create a wealthy nation. As many failed South American countries have demonstrated, you can’t become wealthy by printing money, and yet that is exactly what the global financial system just tried to accomplish by creating hundreds of trillions of dollars worth of securities that had nothing behind them. Printing paper money, the way a government can, and printing an assertion of value on the paper of a security (be it a stock, bond, or CDO,CDS, etc) is fundamentally no different in the sense that both kinds of paper have to represent the real value of something of inherent worth. If you print more money than there is value to be had in the real wealth of an economy, you get out of control inflation. The US knows better than to do this. But what it doesn’t know, or seems to have forgotten, is that if you let banks and corporations find ways of doing the same thing, by issuing securities that have no real direct value behind them, then you will get speculative inflation, bubbles in everything investors can get their hands on, as we have seen, and then the destruction of most all of that fake wealth along with a collapsing of the inflated values of items of real wealth. Sound familiar?
This is a classic economic boom and bust cycle, only this time the bust has to be every destructive because the boom was much too large and it went on for way too long. These kinds of exaggerated economic cycles can be avoided and had been generally avoided for the 25 years following world war two, when there was mostly stable growth and some mild recessions. But in the eighties, when conservative economic policies gained favor, wealth shifted away from working people (the previously broad base of ownership and consumption in the economy) and toward the wealthy and corporations, who found more and more ways to pay fewer and fewer wages, thus lowering the wealth of average people further. The irony is that, for a time, that select group appeared to getting fantastically wealthier, but even they are now imperiled by the catastrophic results of all of this, demonstrating that what appears to benefit some, for a time, if taken to excess (and adopted as cultural norm), will hurt everyone in the long run. It’s time to restore balance to the system, and the way to start is to call junk investments what they are, get rid of them along with the people and mechanisms that created them and start over with a clean slate. Only them can the other stimulus measures proposed by the government take hold and move the middle class back to the center of the US economic engine where they belong. Saving bonus-hog bankers and the financial smoke and mirrors financial types who got us into this will never do that and the more money we waste trying to do that is the more money we will all have to cough up in the long run for our collective mistakes.